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By analyzing a Tennessee bigamy case, a New York same-sex
marriage case, and the growing cultural trend toward cohabitation over
marriage, this article discusses how and why marriage is the best estate
plan to protect vulnerable parties as they age. The article examines how
marriage assists vulnerable parties in avoiding potential conflicts in
estate planning and distribution, particularly when those parties have
entered into alternative relationships. By focusing on the cases of
Witherspoon, in which John Witherspoon entered into a bigamous
second marriage, and Windsor, in which Edie Windsor is suing the U.S.
government over the lack of federal tax recognition afforded her
Canadian same-sex marriage, this article reveals how marriage expansion
does not necessarily incentivize marriage, nor does it provide the benefits
and protections often sought by those who enter into those marriage-like
relationships.
By contrasting the protection marriage affords to a vulnerable party
in estate distribution and the dilemmas presented by marriage expansion
(as illustrated in Witherspoon and Windsor) with the cultural disquiet
over the importance of the nature and meaning of marriage, this article
illuminates estate distribution conflicts in the context of the paradox of
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contemporary American socio-legal marriage culture. Despite the pop
culture confusion over marriage, this article demonstrates why it is still
the best default for estate planning conflicts.
Table of Contents
IN TRODU CTION ............................................................................................... 1220
I. MARRIAGE AS ESTATE PLANNING AND DISTRIBUTION PROTECTION.. 1222
II. MARRIAGE EXPANSION CONFLICTS IN ESTATE PLANNING ................. 1229
A. Witherspoon-Bigamy and Mental Capacity Protection ........... 1229
B. Windsor: Same-Sex Marriage, DOMA, and the Marital
D eduction ................................................................................... 12 35
C. Cohabitation: Marriage, Estate Planning, and the
Cohabitation Paradox ................................................................. 1243
III. SOLUTIONS TO POTENTIAL CONFLICTS TOWARD PROTECTING
V ULNERABLE PARTIES ........................................................................ 1247
A. Alternatives for the Witherspoon Example ................................ 1248
B. Alternatives for the W indsor Example ....................................... 1250
C. Alternatives for Cohabitation .................................................... 1252
C O N C LU SIO N .................................................................................................. 1254
INTRODUCTION
What does a Tennessee bigamy case have to do with a New York
same-sex marriage case? And what does either case have to do with the
growing cultural trend and large demographic of individuals who choose
cohabitation over marriage? The answer is hidden in a simple sentence:
marriage is still the best estate plan. Marriage protects vulnerable parties
as they age, and its benefits are sought after by a small demographic of
same-sex partners. Yet, marriage is ignored or dismissed as unnecessary
by a large demographic of vulnerable cohabiters who do not understand
the legal jeopardy they live in-or die in-without the protection of
marriage.
This article will discuss how marriage assists vulnerable parties in
avoiding potential conflicts in estate planning and distribution when
those parties have entered into alternative relationships. It will reveal
how marriage expansion2 does not necessarily incentivize marriage, nor
2. For purposes of this article, the term "marriage expansion" means any human
consensual relational structure that seeks to mimic marriage by expanding or declining to
recognize the common and generally universal substantive entry requirements for
marriage. See Lynne Marie Kohm, A Reply to "Principles and Prejudice": Marriage
and the Realization that Principles Win Over Political Will, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 293
1220 [Vol. 117:4
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does it provide the benefits and protections often sought by those who
enter into those marriage-like relationships. To illustrate, the article will
focus on two cases: Witherspoon,3 where John Witherspoon-father of
Reese Witherspoon, the well-known actress who played an eager law
student in Legally Blonde4 -entered into a bigamous second marriage in
Tennessee; and Windsor,5 where New York State resident Edie Windsor
is suing the U.S. government over the lack of federal tax recognition
afforded to her Canadian marriage to now-deceased partner Thea Spyer.6
This article will further discuss estate distribution conflicts in
regards to the paradox of contemporary American socio-legal marriage
culture. This paradox will be exposed by contrasting how marriage
protects a vulnerable party in estate distribution dilemmas presented by
marriage expansion, as illustrated in Witherspoon and Windsor. The
notion that marriage offers individuals protection can seem all the more
paradoxical when observing that one segment of the American
population is beating down the door to marriage entry,7 while another
larger segment of the nation's population simultaneously lacks a clear
understanding of the protections that marriage offers.8 Despite the pop
(1996) [hereinafter Kohm, A Reply] (discussing one at a time, unrelated by consanguinity
or affinity, of proper age, and of opposite sex as four categories of substantive
requirements for marriage entry). These requirements are being challenged on many
legal and cultural angles today (as will be analyzed here) and can be seen in law review
articles that challenge that Reply piece. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Kershaw, Towards an
Establishment Theory of Gay Personhood, 58 VAND. L. REv. 555 (2005); Eric Engle,
Knight's Gambit to Fool's Mate: Beyond Legal Realism, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 1633 (2007)
(both of which take serious issue with the opposite sex requirement for marriage entry).
Marriage expansion for purposes of discussion in this article also includes marriage-like
relationships, such as cohabitation arrangements that seek to mimic marriage without its
legal ties, and, as this piece will demonstrate, without the legal benefits in life or death.
3. Witherspoon v. Witherspoon, No. 12D-1447 (Tenn. Davidson Cnty. 7th Cir. Ct.
filed May 8, 2012) (sealed).
4. LEGALLY BLONDE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer & Marc Platt Productions 2001); see
also Danielle & Andy Mayoras, Still Legally Blonde, Reese Witherspoon Goes to Court
to Protect Dad, FORBES (May 14, 2012), http://onforb.es/ITSeN1. The Mayoras'
describe Witherspoon as a "perky young attorney," though that may have been her role in
a sequel. Id.
5. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 176 (2d Cir. 2012).
6. See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text (discussing the facts in Windsor).
7. See supra note 2 (discussing marriage expansion). Note also that the political
and judicial effort to expand marriage to include same-sex partnerships is the prime
contemporary example of marriage expansion. See infra note 89 (providing an overview
of the history of marriage expansion in American toward same-sex partnerships). The
progressive effort to expand marriage to include more than one partner at a time,
however, is also evidence of this ongoing momentum for marriage expansion. See infra
notes 67-84 and accompanying text (providing an overview of those cases).
8. Those protections include marriage benefits not afforded to cohabiting couples.
See infra Part II.C. This mindset is due to several factors, not the least of which is the
high rate of divorce in America today. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL
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culture confusion over marriage,9 this article will show why it is still the
best default for estate planning conflicts.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I will review the basic rules
of marriage as a part of estate planning and asset protection. Part II will
discuss some of the trends in marriage expansion that Witherspoon and
Windsor highlight. Specifically, Part II will summarize the current
litigation on poly-marriage and the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
litigation by same-sex partners. Part II will also discuss how the trend of
expansion in marriage law and policy, along with the trend toward
simple cohabitation, creates potential conflicts in estate planning and
distribution, particularly with relationships unprotected by law.
The focus of Part III is to offer solutions to these potential conflicts
in order to protect vulnerable parties with marriage. This protection is
necessary because, when individuals enter into relationships unprotected
by law, they run the risk of enduring the legal ramifications those
relationships can create. Vulnerable parties who have entered into
alternative relationships unprotected by law are generally the first to find
that marriage remains the best default to avoid estate-planning conflicts.
I. MARRIAGE AS ESTATE PLANNING AND DISTRIBUTION PROTECTION
Intestate succession is the basic scheme for default estate
planning.' 0 That is, when someone dies without a valid will, he or she
dies intestate." Although most wealthy individuals have a will, 12 state
intestate succession laws set forth the statutes of descent and distribution
that control by default when an individual does not have a valid will at
death, or when certain assets are not distributed by a valid will. 3
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 96-98 (2012), available at
http://1.usa.gov/JOBh4w. In fact, one of my students recently stated, "Why would I get
married when at least half of all marriages end in divorce? It would be like going
skydiving with a 50% chance that my parachute would not open." That analogy, though
extreme in my view, might represent the sense of a large segment of American culture.
9. A unique example of pop culture confusion over marriage is the recent revelation
of the surreptitious prank marriage between actress and political pundit Janeane Garofalo
and screen writer Rob Cohen at a Las Vegas drive-thru chapel 20 years ago. They did
not take the event seriously until Cohen tried to marry someone else in 2012. See Ben
Waldron, Janeane Garofalo Unwittingly Married for 20 Years, ABC NEWS BLOGS (Nov.
13, 2012, 8:15 PM), http://abcn.ws/W6qdlj.
10. See ROGER W. ANDERSON, JOHN T. GAUBATZ, IRA MARK BLOOM & LEWIS D.
SOLOMON, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES 35 (Mathew Bender & Co., 1st ed.
1996) (discussing how "an intestate statute provides an 'estate plan' designed by the state
legislature").
11. See id.
12. See Marsha A. Goetting & Peter Martin, Characteristics of Older Adults with
Written Wills, 22 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 243, 253 (2001). In national polls of older,
wealthier groups, 66% of respondents reported having a will. Id.
13. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 35.
1222 [Vol. 117:4
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Furthermore, state law not only controls intestacy and descent but also
controls other factors in an estate distribution. "Generally speaking, the
law of the state where the decedent was domiciled at death governs the
disposition of personal property, and the law of the state where the
decedent's real property is located governs the disposition of her real
property." 14 The primary state policy objective is generally to carry out
the intent of the average intestate decedent.'
5
Marriage is an important foundation of each state's plan. Every
state has a statutory scheme for the intestate share of the spouse as a
primary aspect of the law. "Under current law, the surviving spouse
usually receives at least a one-half share of the decedent's estate,"
although there are many variations as to the specifics. 16 For instance,
some statutory schemes provide for the entire estate to pass to the
surviving spouse."
Marital property systems determine how spouses share property
acquired during their marriage 8 and, depending on the jurisdiction,
spouses have different protections from disinheritance by the decedent
during marriage.' 9  Nearly all states protect against spousal
disinheritance by will with a spousal elective share,20 or what is
sometimes called a "forced share" in the decedent spouse's estate.2' This
spousal elective share allows a surviving spouse to take what the will
provides for him or her, or to elect to take a statutory share of the
decedent's estate regardless of what is provided (or not provided) to that
spouse by will. 22 This elective share is funded with and enforceable
14. JESSE DUKEMINIER, STANLEY M. JOHANSON, JAMES LINDGREN & ROBERT H.
SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 60 (7th ed. 2005).
15. Id. at 62.
16. Id at 63.
17. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (1990) (providing for the entire estate to pass
to the decedent's surviving spouse under certain circumstances). Many community
property states have adopted UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102A, which provides for all
community property to pass to the surviving spouse under many circumstances. See
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 14, at 61 n.3.
18. See JUDITH AREEN, MARC SPINDELMAN, & PHILOMILA TSOUKALA, FAMILY LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1021-22 (6th ed. 2012) (detailing marital property regimes). For
a discussion of the differences and similarities between the various property schemes of
dower, community property, and common law separate property schemes in estate
planning, see ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 219-23.
19. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 222 ("Regardless of a will's provisions,
under traditional elective share statutes a surviving spouse can claim a share of the
decedent's probate estate.").
20. But see GA. CODE ANN. § 53-3-1 (West 2012). Georgia has no elective share,
but rather provides for one year of support for a surviving spouse from a decedent's
estate. Id.
21. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 14, at 425.
22. Id.
2013] 1223
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against much of the property owned by the decedent spouse at death. 3
Surviving spouses enjoy other rights, benefits, and protections in
addition to the elective share, such as social security benefits, pension
benefits (particularly under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act2 4), homestead law benefits to secure the family home,25 a family
allowance for maintenance and support for a fixed period of time while
the estate is settled,26 and important tax benefits.27 The most critical
among these tax benefits is the unlimited marital deduction, which
allows for unlimited spousal transfers during life and at death. 8 These
benefits incentivize marriage, while also increasing its value to the
parties, particularly for the most vulnerable party of the pair by
protecting that party with financial support.
These benefits are principally based in the partnership theory
inherent in marriage as well as the view that marriage is an economic
joint venture. "Disinheritance of a surviving spouse brings into question
the fundamental nature of the economic rights of each spouse in a martial
relationship and the manner in which society views the institution of
marriage.,, 29  This partnership theory of marriage works "as an
expression of the presumed intent of husbands and wives to pool their
fortunes on an equal basis, share and share alike."30  The Uniform
Probate Code (UPC) tries to clarify this presupposition in its general
31comments on the partnership theory of marriage.
23. Exercising the elective share necessarily disrupts an estate plan. ANDERSON ET
AL., supra note 10, at 223. Accordingly, the Uniform Probate Code suggests, and many
states have adopted, the concept of the augmented estate, which provides for a spousal
elective share to be funded from three main categories or assets: the net probate estate,
will substitutes given to third parties, and property given to the surviving spouse from the
decedent spouse before death. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-202 to -207. For an
overview of the augmented estate, see ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 232, 239-41.
24. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006 & Supp. 2011)).
25. See DUKEMINIERETAL., supra note 14, at 421.
26. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-404 (1990) (providing a reasonable allowance for a
period of one year).
27. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 26-29 (discussing the general rules of
estate tax and the specifics of taxes between spouses).
28. See I.R.C. § 2056 (2006).
29. Lawrence W. Wagoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights
Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 IOWA L. REv. 223, 236, 239 (1991)
(discussing the partnership theory of marriage, while later noting that "[e]lective-share
law in the common-law states has not caught up to the partnership theory of marriage"
and how the UPC has worked to correct that). Anderson et al. also note the UPC's efforts
toward reform in applying the "partnership theory of marriage" to spousal election. See
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 233.
30. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 131 (1989).
31. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 2, pt. 2, gen. cmt. at 71 (2010) (quoting Glendon's
theory in the explanation of marriage partnership theory):
[Vol. 117:41224
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Spousal property rights figure prominently at divorce 32 and at death.
"By granting each spouse upon acquisition an immediate half interest in
the earnings of the other, the community-property regimes directly
recognize that the couple's enterprise is in essence collaborative.
33
Perhaps telling of the importance of the foundation of marriage to
American society were the tax-free interspousal transfers included in the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 34 further embedding the
partnership aspect of marriage into law. In the midst of marital change
due to dissolution, the Uniform Marital Property Act was aspired by
some to be a hope for stability in those changes, and a way to continue to
35protect women.
Is the Uniform Marital Property Act a panacea for the malaise of
marriage? ... If it does affect any [positive] considerations, it will
take time and the process will be subtle. The disintegrating forces
operating on marriages and families are many and complex....
Sharing is seen as a system of elemental fairness and justice so that
those who share in the many and diverse forms of work involved in
The partnership theory of marriage, sometimes also called the marital-sharing
theory, is stated in various ways. Sometimes it is thought of "as an expression
of the presumed intent of husbands and wives to pool their fortunes..." [citing
GLENDON, supra note 30, at 71]. Under this approach, the economic rights of
each spouse are seen as deriving from an unspoken marital bargain under which
the partners agree that each is to enjoy a half interest in the fruits of the
marriage, i.e., in the property nominally acquired by and titled in the sole name
of either partner during the marriage.... A decedent who disinherits his or her
surviving spouse is seen as having reneged on the bargain. Sometimes the
theory is expressed in restitutionary terms, a return-of-contribution notion.
Under this approach, the law grants each spouse an entitlement to
compensation for non-monetary contributions to the marital enterprise, as "a
recognition of the activity of one spouse in the home and to compensate not
only for this activity but for opportunities lost.
Id.
32. See generally UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT (1973); see also UNIF. MARITAL
PROP. ACT prefatory note (1983) (discussing the challenges of creating a framework for
marital property in the midst of change, where "' [e]quitable distribution' of property
became the handmaiden of no-fault divorce," and that "it is the equitable distribution
court's demanding role in the judicial process to monitor and referee the ensuing contests
in the divorce courts"); JOHN H. LANGBEIN & LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER, UNIFORM
TRUST AND ESTATE STATUTES 706 (Found. Press 2005) (quoting the UNIF. MARITAL
PROP. ACT prefatory note (1983)).
33. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 2, pt. 2, gen. cmt. at 71 (2010).
34. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
35. LANGBEIN & WAGGONER, supra note 32, at 710 (noting that the Act itself was "a
response to the twenty-year-long challenge of the President's Commission on the Status
of Women issued in 1963 to face the reality that each spouse makes a different but
equally important contribution in a marriage").
2013] 1225
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establishing and maintaining a marriage will have a protected share in
the material acquisitions of that marriage.
36
Thus, even in efforts to stabilize a growing cultural movement
toward divorce, model lawmakers view marriage as a partnership
designed to protect the often-vulnerable spouse and to deepen the
partnership notion of marriage. "Spouses are not trustees or guarantors
toward each other. Neither are they simply parties to a contract
endeavoring to further their individual interest. The duty is between
[spouses], and is one of good faith....
An understanding of the basic nature of marriage is critical to this
discussion of marriage as a partnership. "[M]arriage has a nature
,,38 "h tt antcosindependent of legal conventions. Therefore, "the state cannot choose
or change the essence of real marriage. 39  Deeply rooted theoretical
reasons for marriage include a comprehensive union of oneness of
spouses, a special link to children, and a normative sense of permanence,
monogamy, and exclusivity.40  This conjugal view of marriage has
intrinsic value, and possesses the natural ability to conceive, bear, and
36. LANGBEIN & WAGGONER, supra note 32, at 707, 710 (citing portions of the UNIF.
MARITAL PROP. ACT (1983)).
37. Id. at 711.
38. Sherif Girgis, Robert P. George, & Ryan T. Anderson, What is Marriage?, 34
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 245, 252 (2011). Girgis, George, and Anderson debate two
competing views of marriage: the conjugal view (where marriage is "the union of a man
and a woman who make a permanent and exclusive commitment to each other of the type
that is naturally (inherently) fulfilled by bearing and rearing children together"), and the
revisionist view (where marriage is the union of two people (whether of the same sex or
of opposite sexes) "who commit to romantically loving and caring for each other and to
sharing the burdens and benefits of domestic life"). Id. at 246. For a list of marriage
revisionist theorists, see id. at 252 n.14. Girgis et al. hold to the conjugal view of
marriage, as do other scholars. See, e.g., John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual
Orientation," 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049 (1994) (explaining this notion generally and
linking it to the welfare of children and the common good). By way of full disclosure,
the reader should know that I also hold to the conjugal view of marriage. See Lynne
Marie Kohm, Liberty and Marriage-Baehr and Beyond: Due Process in 1998, 12 BYU J.
PUB. L. 253 (1998); Lynne Marie Kohm, The Homosexual "Union": Should Gay and
Lesbian Partnerships be Granted the Same Status as Marriage?, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 51
(1996).
39. Girgis et al., supra note 38, at 252. In addition, Girgis et al. note that, "in
radically reinventing legal marriage, the state would obscure a moral reality." Id
Consequences to reinventing marriage are numerous. See Lynne Marie Kohm, The
Collateral Effects of Civil Unions on Family Law, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 451 (2002);
Lynne Marie Kohm, How Will the Proliferation and Recognition of Domestic
Partnerships Affect Marriage?, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 105 (2002). The nature of this
position is challenging to academic trends favoring same-sex unions. See Mark A.
Yarhouse & Lynne Marie Kohm, Fairness, Accuracy and Honesty in Discussing
Homosexuality and Marriage, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 249 (2002).
40. Girgis et al., supra note 38, at 252-59 (discussing the basis of each within
marriage).
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raise children in the most stable and economical fashion as solid future
citizens perpetuating the strength of the state, and it is precisely why
states recognize and regulate marriage toward the common good. 41 This
view of marriage offers legal protections throughout the world.42
Marriage as a legal notion and as a social institution, however, has
endured some dramatic adjustments and alterations over the past half
century. One of the largest marriage phenomena of the twentieth century
was the favoring of monogamy in modernity (and the "almost universal[]
disfavoring" of polygamy).43 Another major occurrence and significant
change in the core definition of marriage is the "acceptance of the
individual spouse's right to divorce on demand." 44  The adoption of
unilateral no-fault divorce affording each of the parties to the marriage
an individual right to dissolve the marriage with or without cause, with
or without consent, even over the objection and wishes of the other
spouse,45 has fundamentally altered the nature of marriage. Easy divorce
and marriage expansion have caused the intrinsic value of marriage to be
replaced by its expressive value. The recent move toward marriage
expansion for same-sex partners focuses on the expression of the
partners, rather than the intrinsic value of the relationship, and has been a
strongly political process with cultural components.46 Simultaneously,
41. See Hans Boersma, Defending Marriage, FIRST THINGS 61, 52 (Mar. 2013),
available at http://bit.ly/XFhbSI (reviewing SHERIF GIRGIs, ROBERT P. GEORGE & RYAN
T. ANDERSON, WHAT IS MARRIAGE? MAN AND WOMAN: A DEFENSE (2012)) (discussing
comprehensive sexual activity that is biologically reproductive by nature "that is ordered
to the common good").
42. Lynn D. Wardle, What is Marriage?, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADvoc. 53,
81 (2006). Professor Wardle offers a thorough review of constitutional protection for the
conjugal relationship of marriage, noted nationally in state law and internationally in
national law. His appendices therein demonstrate the pervasive and foundational nature
of conjugal marriage globally. See id at 98-103.
43. Id. at 80-81. "Monogamy has been associated with modernity, affluence,
education, women's rights, and with the benefits of modem living, while polygamy is
associated with old-fashioned, patriarchal, antiquated notions of marriage and living." Id.
at 80. Professor Wardle also notes that, even where polygamy is allowed, it is
disfavored. Lynn D. Wardle, International Marriage and Divorce Regulation and
Recognition: A Survey, 29 FAM. L.Q. 497, 500-02 (1995).
44. Wardle, supra note 42, at 81.
45. See Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU
L. REV. 79, 80 (1991) (discussing how unilateral no-fault divorce has altered marriage
dissolution).
46. By "political," I mean the development of same-sex marriage as an argument
that has divided states and the nation, from the courtroom to the ballot box, as to what
marriage means in law. Citizens of three states have voted to allow same-sex marriage,
while courts of six states have done so judicially. Deron Dalton, Nine States Least Likely
to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage Anytime Soon, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 2, 2013, 11:48
AM), http://huff.to/XOSCSf. Citizens of 31 states (California has voted accordingly, but
its amendment is under challenge at the U.S. Supreme Court in Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d
1052 (9th Cir. 2012), appeal docketed, No. 12-144 (Mar. 26, 2013)) have amended their
2013] 1227
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the movement away from marriage completely toward a preference of
cohabitation47 somewhat demonstrates an exhaustion with this vast
alteration process.
From the no-fault divorce revolution that began with then Governor
Ronald Regan's signature in 1969,48 to expansion of entry requirements
for marriage,' 9 to preferences for cohabitation,5 ° marriage is not viewed
as having the protective legal status it once enjoyed. What is lost in
these trends is that, despite the changes, marriage is still the best estate
plan, offering legal protections from incapacity, estate tax benefits, and a
host of financial benefits in death. Marriage expansion, however, does
not provide the same legal protections as marriage. Consequently, when
parties enter into relationships that attempt to parallel or emulate
marriage but bear some defect of a basic legal requirement, those parties
can suffer.
constitutions to include a definition of marriage and its recognition in their public policy.
See Lynn Bonner & Jay Price, N.C. to Add Marriage Amendment to Its Constitution,
NEWSOBSERVER.COM (Oct. 5, 2012), http://bit.ly/KjOgQX. A recent example of a court
challenge to such a state constitutional amendment involves Nevada's marriage
amendment, and whether a federal court will find that it is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. Sevcik v. Sandoval, No. 2:12-cv-00578-RCJ-PAL, 2012 WL
5989662, at *1 (D. Nev. Nov. 26, 2012). Interestingly, although the Ninth Circuit has not
yet decided this case, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court in
advance of the Ninth Circuit judgment. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before
Judgment, Coalition for the Protection of Marriage v. Sevcik (No. 12-689), 2012 WL
6054793.
47. Paige D. Martin et al., Adolescent Premarital Sexual Activity, Cohabitation, and
Attitudes Toward Marriage, 36 ADOLESCENCE 601, 601 (2001).
48. The first no-fault cause of action for divorce was signed into law in California;
although originally a bilateral statutory regulation allowing marriage partners to mutually
end their incompatible marriage in dissolution, the current law allows for unilateral
divorce. California Family Law Act, ch. 1608, §§ 1-32, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3312 (Supp.
1986) (repealed 1994) (re-enacted 1994, current version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 2000 et
seq. (West 2012)) (divorce for irreconcilable differences). For a discussion of how this
demand for divorce altered marital stability, see MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY,
DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 195-99 (1972). The last state to adopt a unilateral approach to
no-fault divorce was New York in 2010. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(7) (McKinney
2010).
49. Basic entry requirements at common law were one at a time, of opposite sex,
unrelated by blood or sanguinity, and of minimum age. See Lynne Marie Kohm, A
Reply, supra note 2, at 296-303 (1996) (describing the basis for these substantive
marriage entry requirements).
50. See Jay D. Teachman et al., The Changing Demography of America's Families,
62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1234, 1238 (2000).
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II. MARRIAGE EXPANSION CONFLICTS IN ESTATE PLANNING
A. Witherspoon-Bigamy and Mental Capacity Protection
When Dr. John Witherspoon married Tricianne Taylor on January
14, 2012,51 he neglected to remember that he was still married to Betty
(Mary) Witherspoon.52  Tricianne refused to respond to inquiries
regarding her marriage to Witherspoon even though Tricianne, age 60, is
living with retired Dr. John Witherspoon, age 70, in a Nashville
condominium owned by Reese Witherspoon (John and Mary's daughter).
In light of what may appear to have been John's on-setting dementia,
Mary Witherspoon filed for and won a protective order against Tricianne
on behalf of John.53 Mary has also filed a bigamy claim against
Tricianne to annul the marriage, seeking family property that Tricianne
received. Mary is also seeking Tricianne's removal from the Nashville
condominium. 54 Alleging incapacity, John's daughter, Reese, joined by
her mother Mary, filed a petition in a Tennessee court to request
conservatorship over John, who voluntarily appeared before the court
with them.
55
Although the information available on this case is sparse due to
sealed court records, Witherspoon is an important case because of its
implications surrounding marriage as part of an estate distribution plan.
Mental or testamentary capacity may be an obvious consideration in
these circumstances, 56 but the legal meaning of marriage is what has
51. Witherspoon-Taylor, JACKSONSUN.COM (Apr. 22, 2012), http://bit.ly/X1ELlm.
52. See, e.g., Luchina Fisher & Kevin Dolak, John Witherspoon, Reese
Witherspoon's Dad, Accused of Bigamy, ABCNEWS.COM (May 10, 2012),
http://abcn.ws/Kp9A7V; Duane W. Gang, Reese Witherspoon's Dad Sued for Bigamy,
USATODAY.COM (May 9, 2012, 8:27 PM), http://usat.ly/ZidGFQ.
53. Fischer & Dolak, supra note 52. Tricianne Taylor Witherspoon's legal name is
Patricia Taylor. John does not remember marrying her, nor does he remember other
recent events. Id.
54. Danielle Majorhas & Andy Majorhas, Legally Blonde Reese Witherspoon Goes
to Court to Protect Father from Bigamy, TRIAL & HEIRS (May 15, 2012),
http://bit.ly/YBrCbq. Majorhas and Majorhas reported:
Mary alleged in her court filing that John and Tricianne used fraud or forgery,
with her possibly posing as Mrs. John Witherspoon, to trick a bank into lending
$400,000 to them. She said that Tricianne has tried to borrow money as John's
wife. She's also living in his condo, driving their families' [sic] vehicles, and
even has convinced John to sign a new will.
Id.
55. Danielle Majorhas & Andy Majorhas, Still Legally Blonde, Reese Witherspoon
Goes to Court to Protect Dad, FORBES.COM (May 14, 2012, 10:26 AM),
http://onforb.es/ITSeN 1. The case has been sealed to protect the vulnerable parties. Id
56. See generally Howard S. Klein, Of Sound Mind. While the Test for Capacity for
Marriage is Relatively Simple, It is More Complicated During Divorce, 35 L.A. LAW. 29
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worked to protect John from his own poor (and perhaps criminal)57
marital decision making.
Requirements for mental capacity in estate planning are somewhat
minimal58 but generally require that a testator understand the people who
are legally the objects of his bounty, what his property includes, and how
he is distributing it according to an estate plan. 59  The requirements
inherently require the testator's competency and ability to communicate
his or her true desires and intent.6°
Capacity includes "one of the most bothersome concepts in all the
law": undue influence. 61 Generally, undue influence may be established
by proving that (1) the testator was susceptible to the influence, (2) the
influencer had the disposition or motive to exercise undue influence,
(3) the influencer had the opportunity to exercise undue influence, and
(4) the disposition resulted from the influence. However, "this
formulation begs the question because it does not tell us what influence
is undue. 62 The general notion is that a confidential relationship must
exist (and marriage provides such a relationship) to trigger a concern of
undue influence, and suspicious circumstances surrounding the
preparation, execution, or formulation of the donative transfer must be
63present. In Witherspoon, John Witherspoon's second (bigamous) wife
may have initiated the marriage in hopes of gaining access to his fortune,
but that objective is impossible because of his prior marriage. Therefore,
John's first marriage protected him from his own incapacity and will
ultimately protect him from losing his estate assets. These circumstances
beg the question: does entry into such an alternative marriage hint at
incapacity, either to enter into a valid marriage or to handle one's own
estate? Here, it is unclear whether John adequately understood the
people who are legally the objects of his bounty regarding his spousal
(Oct. 2012) (discussing mental capacity for entry into marriage in California and
contrasting it with incapacity in petitioning for divorce).
57. Bigamy is criminal activity in Tennessee under TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-301
(West 2012). Bigamy is also illegal in all 50 states. See Bigamy, 11 AM. JUR. 2d § 1
(2003). If determined to be suffering from dementia, John's conduct would not be
charged as criminal.
58. For the elements of testamentary capacity, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1 (2003).
59. Id.
60. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 14, at 146.
61. Id. at 158-59 ("Undue influence may occur where there is a confidential
relationship between the parties or where there is no such relationship. Proof may be
wholly inferential and circumstantial.").
62. Id. at 159. For a statutory review of the concept of undue influence, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3
(2003) and comments following the description of suspicious circumstances.
63. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 14, at 161.
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obligations. Whether he remembered his marital obligation to Mary,
John was apparently susceptible to the influence of Tricianne in entering
into a new marriage as well as in sharing his property. Allegations that
his actions reveal her influence over him are credible in light of the
financial benefits Tricianne has reaped from her marriage to John.
64
The invalid bigamous marriage will have no effect on John's first
wife in the event of his death. "Bigamous marriages pose special
problems. Because a married person lacks the capacity to remarry
without divorce, second and subsequent 'spouses' have void
relationships with the bigamist. Upon the bigamist's death, theoretically
(and in most jurisdictions, practically) only the first spouse qualified to
inherit, even if long deserted by the decedent., 65 At John's death, the
bigamous spouse is left with nothing. The only alternative for the
bigamous spouse is, at best, possibly receiving an equitable remedy to
petition for an intestate spousal share, but only if there is a showing of
proof that she entered into the marriage in good faith.66
The invalid marriage disqualifies the second spouse from the default
protection marriage provides a (legitimate) surviving spouse, while the
lawful marriage simultaneously protects the valid marriage partner's
interest and prevents the bigamous partner from profiting from the
illegitimacy of the marriage. The inherent statutory rules regarding
marriage, both surrounding entry into marriage and property sharing in
marriage, offer legal foundations that will work to protect John
Witherspoon from his own poor decision making. Because marriage in
64. See Majorhas & Majorhas, supra note 55. Apparently, the property includes a
vehicle or two, a hefty loan of $400,000, and other borrowed funds, in addition to
whatever she might have gained outright from John as gifts. Additionally, undue
influence requires a showing that an estate plan resulted from the influence. Here, it has
been reported that John "signed a new will," allegedly resulting from Tricianne's
influence. Id.
65. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 42.
66. Id. at 42. Anderson et al. also explain the only possible remedy for the second
spouse is to invoke the concept of the "putative spouse," which would allow upon the
death of the bigamous spouse a petition by an otherwise innocent spouse for some sort of
spousal intestate share or equitable remedy based on his or her good faith that the
marriage had been valid when entered into. Section 209 of the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act describes this concept:
Any person who has cohabited with another to whom he is not legally married
in the good faith belief that he was married to that person is a putative spouse
until knowledge of the fact that he is not legally married terminated his status
and prevents acquisition of further rights. A putative spouse acquired the rights
conferred upon a legal spouse .... If there is a legal spouse or other putative
spouses,. . . the court shall apportion property, maintenance, and support rights
among the claimants as appropriate in the circumstances and in the interests of
justice.
Id. (citing UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 209 (amended in 1971 and 1973)).
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Tennessee requires John to have only one spouse at a time, the law has
protected him from his inability to remember how many spouses he has,
thus protecting his estate. Marriage law has protected him, and his wife,
against his own mental incapacity. The facts surrounding the case also
offer solid evidence that marriage is a protective status in estate
distribution when one spouse becomes vulnerable to the influence of a
disreputable party or enters into an illegitimate marriage.
Bigamy in the Witherspoon case presents an opportunity for some
interesting legal analysis regarding marriage expansion trends toward
having more than one spouse at a time. Current trends can be instructive
here. A review of the litigation begins in Canada with the
constitutionality of that nation's law criminalizing the practice of
polygamy.67 In November 2011, the Supreme Court of British Columbia
upheld the code's constitutionality.68 While the Attorney General for
British Columbia characterized the case against polygamy as about harm
to vulnerable parties, the law's challengers argued that the case was not
about harm, but instead about an unacceptable government intrusion
"into the most basic of rights guaranteed by the Charter-the freedom to
practice one's religion, and to associate in family units with those whom
one chooses., 69 The Court agreed with the government that this case
primarily dealt with harm, including the harm that women
disproportionately suffer from in physical, psychological, and sexual
abuse, 70 as well as the various harms to children, 71 and overall harm to
67. In re A Reference Concerning the Constitutionality of Section 293 of the
Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588 (Can.) [hereinafter "Section 293"] (also
known as the Bountiful case). This ruling came after polygamy charges were brought
against two men in the village of Bountiful, part of the province of British Columbia, but
the charges were dropped in 2009 partially amid concerns about the law's constitutional
status. The men were a part of a sect of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints. The criminal investigation of the sect presented evidence that eight
girls from the village of Bountiful, some as young as twelve, had been sent to the United
States to marry men there.
68. Judge Bauman wrote a 355-page opinion after hearing over 42 days of testimony
from both sides. Id.
69. Id
70. Women in polygamous marriages encounter more domestic violence and abuse,
shorter life spans, and worse economic conditions than do women in monogamous
marriages. These disadvantages arise largely from the division of the husband's care and
financial resources and, together with the resultant competition among wives, these
factors lead to increased metal health problems. Id. 584. Some feminist scholarship
has come out of the case that is also concerned with violence against women and
children. See, e.g., Melanie Heath, The Sticky Wicket of Regulating Violence Against
Women in Polygamy: Feminist Perspective on the Constitutional Challenge in Canada,
SECOND ISA F. Soc. (Aug. 12, 2012), http://bit.ly/ I06joZd.
71. Children of polygamous marriages face higher rates of abuse; neglect; infant
mortality; emotional, physical, and behavioral problems; and educational setbacks.
These issues flow from several factors that mark polygamous households: heightened
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society.72 Of additional concern to the Court was the impact of
polygamy on society and monogamous marriage.73 The importance of
upholding the legislative body's concerns for protecting vulnerable
women and children in light of the damaging effects of polygamy was
the focus of this case, demonstrating both societal and legislative
concerns for protecting monogamous marriage.
The most renowned case challenging marriage entry rules against
multiple marital partners is Brown v. Herbert.74 Brown and his wives,
Meri Brown, Janelle Brown, Christine Brown, and Robyn Sullivan,
brought an action against the State of Utah, challenging the state's anti-
bigamy statute as unconstitutional and seeking to enjoin its
enforcement. 75 The lawsuit alleges that Utah's anti-polygamy laws are a
violation of the Browns' Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests as well
as a violation of their First Amendment rights to religious freedom.
76
emotional tension, jealous rivalry among wives, births to very young mothers in short
intervals, and the inability of fathers to provide adequate personal affection and discipline
to each child. "Early marriage for girls is common, frequently to significantly older men.
The resultant early sexual activity, pregnancies and childbirth have negative health
implications for girls, and also significantly limit their socio-economic development."
Section 293, supra note 67, 586. Canadian judicial rulings that altered meanings within
marriage and family law may have laid some foundation for the claims and arguments set
forth in this case. See Lynne Marie Kohm, The First Amendment, Homosexual Unions,
and "Newspeak": Has the Language Surrounding the Marriage Debate Altered the
Nature of Marriage Itself or Affected the Truth of the Issues Inherent in Alternative
Marriage Demands?, 4 LIBERTY U. L. REv. 593, 596, 598, 606, 608-10 (2010) (giving
specific instances of changes to Canadian law that affect the nature and meaning of
marriage).
72. According to the court, as older men acquire more wives, skewing the sex ratio,
younger men often leave the community with little education, skills, or social support.
Additionally, both boys and girls observe, and may internalize, "harmful gender
stereotypes." Section 293, supra note 67, 603(e).
73. The negative impacts that can be expected to accompany polygamy in any
society include a class of poor, unmarried, violence-prone young men, institutionalized
gender inequality, fewer civil liberties, and other negative consequences of the large,
poor families that are often created by polygamy.
Individuals in polygamous societies tend to have fewer civil liberties than their
counterparts in societies which prohibit the practice .... Polygamy's harm to
society includes the critical fact that a great many of its individual harms are
not specific to any particular religious, cultural or regional context. They can
be generalized and expected to occur wherever polygamy exists.
Section 293, supra note 67, 13, 14. Some scholarship argues that this case is sound
public policy. See, e.g., Nicholas Bala, Why Canada's Prohibition of Polygamy is
Constitutionally Valid and Sound Social Policy, 25 CAN. J. FAM. L. 165 (2009).
74. Brown v. Herbert, 850 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1244 (D. Utah 2012).
75. Id. The case has also been referred to as the "Sister Wives" lawsuit, after their
TLC show of the same name. See "Sister Wives" Lawsuit: Kody Brown and Family
Suing Utah Over Bigamy Law, HUFFINGTON POST (July 25, 2012, 10:04 AM),
http://huff.to/PlrbzS [hereinafter Sister Wives].
76. See "Sister Wives," supra note 75. Some claim minority religious liberty claims
are important to this case. See, e.g., Richard A. Vazquez, The Practice of Polygamy:
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Currently, the case remains on the court's docket. Two motions to
dismiss submitted by the Utah Attorney General were denied based on
findings that Brown's claims were meritorious and not moot.
77
The Brown case has important implications for marriage in estate
planning. Marital death benefits at law are provided for one spouse: the
first spouse.78 That legal fact leaves the illegitimate spouses potentially
destitute in the eventual death of Mr. Brown,79 without an intestate share
or an elective share in his estate.80  In Brown, as in Witherspoon,
marriage is the best estate plan for the first spouse because the law
protects the estate for the first spouse and her husband only.
The third analysis on marriage expansion toward multiple partners
surrounds the "Brazil Thruple.' When three men living in Rio de
Janeiro sharing bills and expenses applied for a civil union stating they
wished to protect one another in the event of separation or death, the
Public Notary in Sao Paulo accepted their application.82 The union has
sparked outrage by many who claim it is "absurd and illegal. 83 Though
the Brazilian thruple controversy may cause some to reconsider whether
Legitimate Free Exercise of Religion or Legitimate Public Menace-Revisiting Reynolds
in Light of Modern Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 225
(2001).
77. See Brown, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 1255.
78. No text even contemplates more than one spouse. For a typical example, see
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 14, at 61. There is some sparse scholarship, however,
promoting poly-marriage. See, e.g., Vazquez, supra note 76; Samantha Slark, Are Anti-
Polygamy Laws an Unconstitutional Infringement on the Liberty Interests of Consenting
Adults, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 451 (2004); Kristen A. Berberick, Marrying into the Heaven:
The Constitutionality of Polygamy Bans Under the Free Exercise Clause, 44
WILLAMETTE L. REv. 105 (2007).
79. The second, third, and fourth wives may be able to assert some claim as putative
spouses, as discussed in ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 42. Winning this claim
would hinge on the ability to prove that each entered into their marriage in good faith.
See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 209 (amended 1971 & 1973). That would
require each spouse to prove that he or she thought the plural marriage was legal. That
claim, however, is destroyed by the fact that, together, the Browns are suing the state of
Utah to validate their marriage, proving knowledge of the invalid marriage.
80. It is likely that the other wives would be considered legally as dependent
relatives, allowing them to share in the homestead rights and any other family allowances
under the laws of Utah. A bequest or devise left to any of the four spouses by will would
not be invalidated by the illegal marriage, but rather would be valid based on the
testator's intent to make the transfer. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (2003) (requiring that the testator's intent be "given
effect to the maximum extent allowed by law").
81. Three-person Civil Union Sparks Controversy in Brazil, BBC NEWS (Aug. 28,
2012, 3:08 PM), http://bbc.in/POBNWO.
82. Id.
83. Id. For further observations on this case, see The Thruple, FAM. RESTORATION
BLOG (Sept. 17, 2012), http://bit.ly/WPBLE1.
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traditional monogamous marriage is outdated, 84 this case demonstrates
the foundational character of marriage to estate planning. These
individuals wanted to enter into marriage to ensure the best estate plan
for one another. As an estate planning default mechanism, those who
pursue marriage expansion see that marriage is the best default plan in
estate conflicts. That pursuit, however, dismisses marriage's foundation
outright by expanding it into a new form, effectively denying its inherent
nature of oneness between two people. The expressive value of marriage
cannot replace or deny its intrinsic value, being the substance of family
growth and societal formation, and the natural and fundamental
partnership of two people and, therefore, a significant means of default
wealth transfer.
Marriage expansion toward more than one spouse at a time
challenges the nature of marriage itself but also reveals that the estate
default underpinning of marriage as protective of spouses is a desirable
estate planning mechanism. As the next section sets forth, those working
toward marriage expansion for spouses of the same sex are also finding
this fact to be true.
B. Windsor: Same-Sex Marriage, DOMA, and the Marital Deduction
A leading casebook notes "[t]he chief policies that underpin the
spousal intestate share-giving effect to the probable intent of the
decedent and protection of those whom the decedent treated as family-
seem also to apply to domestic partners. 85 However, the law currently
does not afford domestic partners the same protections. Windsor v.
United States, the New York same-sex marriage case challenging the
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and federal tax laws, presents
a politically powerful case of spousal benefits as inuring to same-sex
couples. 86 Windsor's eagerness to be included in marriage protection
shows that the advantages of marriage as a default estate plan are
significant. This section will offer a summary of that case, a review of
the amici it evoked, and a summary of the law surrounding DOMA and
the marital deduction.
Congress passed DOMA in 1996,87 defining spousal rights under
federal programs as those of marriages between one man and one
84. Jean Hannah Edelstein, Why Shouldn't Three People Get Married?, GUARDIAN
(Aug. 30, 2012, 12:07 PM), http://bit.ly/QCIFdD.
85. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 14, at 65.
86. Windsor v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG, http://bit.ly/14hDWEJ (last visited
Mar. 12, 2013) (stating that Windsor is docketed at No. 12-63).
87. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified
at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738).
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woman, and providing that states could not be forced to recognize same-
sex unions performed in other jurisdictions.88 Several cases have
provided the foundation for challenging the Act;89 other pending
litigation over DOMA have built upon that foundation, some resulting in
holding DOMA constitutional,9" while others have resulted in holding
DOMA to be unconstitutional. 9' Windsor brings the DOMA challenges
to a pinnacle in the context of marriage as an estate-planning tool.
88. "DOMA thus simply codifies in this area of law the long recognized public
policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause." Cort I. Walker, The Defense of
Marriage Act as an Efficacious Expression of Public Policy: Towards a Resolution of
Miller v. Jenkins and the Emerging Conflict Between States over Same-Sex Parenting, 20
REGENT U. L. REV. 363, 381 (2008).
89. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003)
(finding for the first time as a U.S. state court that same-sex couples have the right to
marry, which is important to DOMA litigation because, after this case, same-sex couples
now had standing to sue the federal government over DOMA); see also Vamrnum v. Brien,
763 N.W.2d 862 (2009) (holding that Iowa's limitation on marriage as non-inclusive of
same-sex couples was a violation of equal protection principles and Iowa's constitution).
90. See In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 148 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004); Wilson v. Ake,
354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2005). See generally Smelt v. County of Orange,
374 F. Supp. 2d 861 (C.D. Cal. 2005). In re Kandu involved a Washington bankruptcy
case where an American same-sex couple married in Canada and then filed a joint
chapter seven bankruptcy in Washington. In re Kandu, 315 BR. at 130. The bankruptcy
court objected to their filing, which was upheld by federal district court under a rational
basis analysis rejecting any claims that same-sex couples should be granted heightened
scrutiny. Id. Wilson involved a lesbian couple validly married in Massachusetts and
living in Florida. Wilson, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1301-02. The couple sued the Florida
county clerk for failing to recognize their marriage, arguing that DOMA was
unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Privileges and Immunities
Clause, the Commerce Clause, and Due Process and Equal Protections Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The case was summarily dismissed, with the court
concluding that the Supreme Court does not require a state to apply another state's law in
violation of its own public policy; the court held that there is no new fundamental right to
private sexual intimacy, further clarifying that sexual orientation is subject to rational
basis, not a heightened scrutiny. Id. at 1309. Smelt involved a same-sex couple
registered under California's Domestic Partner law that sued Orange County, California
in federal court for refusing to issue them a marriage license, arguing that DOMA
violated the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Smelt, 374 F. Supp. 2d at
864-65. The district court dismissed the couple's challenge to Section 2 of DOMA
because they were not married (and therefore did not have standing) but allowed them to
proceed under Section 3 of DOMA. Id. at 870-71. The court then held that DOMA's
marriage definition was constitutional because it did not involve sex discrimination or a
fundamental right and further upheld the rational basis standard of review, finding the
legitimate interest to encourage stability and legitimacy in the optimal union for
procreating and raising children was a rational basis. Id. at 880. For an excellent
overview and policy analysis of these cases, their consequences, and their implications,
see Joshua Baker & William C. Duncan, As Goes DOMA False.. . Defending DOM4
and the State Marriage Measures, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 1 (2012).
91. See Gill v. Office ofPers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding
that DOMA exceeded Congress's authority under the Spending Clause when GLAD filed
on behalf of seven same-sex couples married in Massachusetts and three individuals,
alleging DOMA is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment by denying them access
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Edie Windsor and Thea Spyer began their relationship in 1963,
registered as domestic partners 30 years later when New York law
allowed such registration, and married in Canada in 2007.92 New York
began recognizing Canadian same-sex marriages in 2008. 93 In 2009,
Spyer passed away, leaving her estate to Windsor in her will. 94 Because
Windsor did not qualify for the unlimited marital deduction95 under
DOMA,96 Spyer's estate was charged with federal estate tax of
$363,053. 9'
Windsor's subsequent suit sought a refund of the estate tax as well
as a declaration that DOMA's definition of marriage in Section Three is
to federal employee benefits, retirement benefits, spousal survivor benefits, and other
federal privileges); see also Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs.,
698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass 2010) (arguing that DOMA exceeds Congress's
enumerated powers and infringes upon the states' right to define marital status as granted
by the Tenth Amendment, with the same judge from Gill also holding here that DOMA is
unconstitutional because it infringes on the rights of the states to regulate marital status
and that the law lacked a rational basis); In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
2011) (holding DOMA unconstitutional where same-sex plaintiffs challenged DOMA
seeking to be considered joint petitioners on their bankruptcy petition; the Department of
Justice decided it would not appeal the decision). A number of cases are before the U.S.
Supreme Court for review. See GLAD, PENDING CASES CHALLENGING THE DEFENSE OF
MARRIAGE ACT (DOMA) (2013), available at http:/Ibit.ly/OoerO3.
92. Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
93. See Martinez v. County of Monroe, 50 A.D.3d 189, 192 (2008) (ruling a same-
sex marriage in Canada should be recognized in New York State). New York's
legislature legalized same-sex marriage in 2011. See Nicholas Confessoro & Michael
Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2011),
http://nyti.ms/100nm74. However, BLAG argues that, at the time of Spyer's death, New
York did not recognize same-sex marriages, causing Windsor to lack standing in the
matter. See Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives v. Gill,
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 13, 2012), http://bit.ly/Ziw55u; see also Mark Hamblett, Amicus
Briefs Pour Into Second Circuit for Review of DOMA Validity, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 13, 2012),
http://bit.ly/14o6cWz ("At the minimum, BLAG states, the circuit would have to certify
the question of legal recognition of their marriage to the New York Court of Appeals.").
94. Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
95. Codified at I.R.C. § 2056, the unlimited marital deduction is "the most important
deduction... for transfers to surviving spouses." ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 28.
"The Federal Defense of Marriage Act prevents the application of various rights and
privileges otherwise available to married same-sex couples in any federal context by only
recognizing the word 'marriage' as a legal union between a man and a woman, and the
word 'spouse' as only a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." Tamara
E. Kolz Griffin, Estate Planning for Same Sex Couples, A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUC. (Oct. 2012), available at TSUB1 1 ALI-ABA 33 (Westlaw) (citing 1 U.S.C.
§ 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006)).
96. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified
at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738).
97. Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.98 The U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York first heard the case, ruling
that DOMA is unconstitutional and that Windsor is therefore entitled to a
refund of the estate tax. 99 The court found DOMA unconstitutional
because there was no rational relationship between DOMA and the
governmental interests involved.' 00 On appeal, the Second Circuit held
that intermediate scrutiny, rather than a rational basis, is the proper
standard for DOMA, 10' holding the Act unconstitutional as not
substantially related to a proffered government interest. 0 2 The case is
now under appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
0 3
An analysis of Windsor is complicated by the politics and policy of
the law surrounding the cases. The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of
the U.S. House of Representatives (BLAG) stepped in to defend
DOMA 10 4 after the Department of Justice declined to defend the Act due
98. Confessoro & Barbaro, supra note 93; see also Jennifer H. Cunningham &
Samuel Goldsmith, Gay Rights Activist Edith Windsor Sues Feds Over Estate Taxes,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 10, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://nydn.us/13p7wca.
99. Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 405. While declining to address whether
homosexuals are a suspect class, the ruling articulated that the Supreme Court's dismissal
of a previous equal protection challenge to a marriage-restrictive state law was not
binding precedent because the dismissal hinged on the lack of federal question and thus
addressed a different legal issue. Holding homosexuals as a suspect class would have
required DOMA to be subject to a heightened standard of review, but that inquiry was
unnecessary because the judge found DOMA to fail even a rational basis test, which
would require a law's classification of groups to be rationally related to a government
interest. Id. at 399, 400, 402.
100. Those interests include approaching changes to traditional marriage laws with
caution, encouraging responsible procreation, or maintaining consistency among federal
benefit eligibility and, as the court noted, the government's interest in conserving
resources, while related, was not a legitimate reason to classify groups. Id. at 402, 405.
101. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2012).
102. Id. at 187. The court also noted that this is the proper standard when
homosexuals have endured a history of discrimination; the sexual orientation distinction
bears no relation to ability to contribute to society, homosexuality is a discernible
characteristic, and homosexuals are a politically powerless minority. Id. at 182-85.
103. Windsor v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG, http://bit.ly/14hDWEJ (last visited
Mar. 11, 2013). The High Court specifically stated its grant for certiorari reflects a
concern for standing when the Executive will not defend the congressional law. See
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). The ideas presented in this article
regarding marriage will not be altered by the outcome of this case. The strategies
presented in Section 3 are valid estate planning strategies to avoid assessed estate taxes;
marriage will remain the best default for estate planning conflicts regardless of the
Supreme Court's decision. The outcome of the Windsor case, which will decide the
federal definition of marriage rather than the tax implications of marriage, does not affect
the principles of estate planning discussed in this article. Whatever the outcome of
Windsor, marriage will remain the best default for estate planning even if marriage is
legally expanded to include same-sex couples.
104. Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group has been defending DOMA in each of the pending
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to the Attorney General's and the President of the United States' belief
that the law was unconstitutional. °5 Because many parties weighed in
on the significance and impact of Windsor,10 6 providing an overview of
amicus briefs submitted to the Second Circuit in Windsor is important
and offers insight into the nature of marriage itself and its importance as
an estate-planning tool.107
Among the amicus briefs submitted to the Second Circuit in favor
of Windsor (and therefore against DOMA), several argued for the Act to
be analyzed under a heightened scrutiny because the Act serves to
irrationally exclude same-sex couples from safeguards established in
various areas of federal law. 10 8 One brief claimed that, based on the
litigations before the Supreme Court. See Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House
of Representatives v. Gill, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 13, 2012), http://bit.ly/Ziw55u.
105. For more information on these events, see Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act
(Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://1.usa.gov/fiP6Kp. The unilateral presidential decision
on a law's constitutionality is not known to have a basis in the Article I executive powers
provided by the U.S. Constitution. But see Lynn D. Wardle, Section Three of the Defense
of Marriage Act: Deciding, Democracy, and the Constitution, 58 DRAKE L. REv. 951
(2010) (providing an overview of the separation of powers doctrine and the
constitutionality of DOMA).
106. For more information on the significance of Windsor, see Hamblett, supra note
93.
107. Fourteen amicus briefs were submitted in favor of Windsor and five were
submitted in defense of DOMA. See id.
108. See Brief of Amicus Curiae of The Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
Washington on the Merits in Support of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 6, Windsor
v. United States, No. 90-567 (U.S. petition for cert. filed Sept. 11, 2012) (arguing that
DOMA makes provisions designed to prevent conflicts of interest, nepotism, tax
avoidance, and bankruptcy filings that harm creditors' interests inapplicable to same-sex
partners); see also Amicus Brief of the Members of the U.S. House of Representatives-
Including Objecting Members of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, Representatives
Nancy Pelosi and Steny H. Hoyer at 4, 6, 17, 23, 25, 27, Windsor v. United States, No.
90-567 (U.S. petition for cert. filed Sept. 11, 2012) (arguing that, under the appropriate
standard of heightened judicial review, DOMA fails because it undercuts the policy
objectives of the laws it affects and indicating that it is not the product of neutral
lawmaking, that DOMA undermines the federal government's interest in supporting
stable families, that it interferes with traditional federal recognition of state marriage
laws, that its purported conservation of government resources does not justify equal
protection violations, and that it is not justified by a desire for uniformity in marriage
requirements); Amicus Brief of Professors of Family and Child Welfare Law at 6,
Windsor v. United States, No. 90-567 (U.S. petition for cert. filed Sept. 11, 2012)
(arguing that DOMA fails under any standard because marriage is not grounded in the
procreativity of male-female relationships and because state interest does not favor
biological parentage over alternative forms of family building, among other things);
Amicus Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund at 6, Windsor v. United
States, No. 90-567 (U.S. petition for cert.filed Sept. 11, 2012) (arguing for an application
of a heightened scrutiny standard to advance civil rights to protect against government
action that perpetuates social inferiority of groups facing sustained discrimination).
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precedent of Lawrence v. Texas,' °9 and consistent with statements from
the Executive Branch," ° heightened scrutiny is the proper standard for
distinctions premised upon sexual orientation. I ' One brief took a
slightly different position, arguing that a rational basis review of DOMA
is not necessarily deferential to federal or state legislatures and insisting
on an adequate explanation of why the federal government has singled
out a particular group of people for exclusion from marriage even under
a rational basis review. 2
Some amicus briefs argued that DOMA restricts particular interests
and benefits," 13 while two briefs argued for state authority, 14 and another
109. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575-78 (2003).
110. See supra note 104.
111. Amicus Brief of the Bar Associations and Public Interest and Legal Service
Organizations at 6, Windsor v. United States, No. 90-567 (U.S. petition for cert. filed
Sept. 11, 2012) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578, and arguing that, although DOMA
would fail even a rational basis test, establishing heightened scrutiny as the appropriate
standard in Windsor is the best way to protect gay men and lesbians from future
discrimination). This brief was submitted on behalf of 34 organizations. Id. at i-xiii.
112. Amicus Brief of The Columbia Law School Sexuality and Gender Law Clinic at
6, Windsor v. United States, No. 90-567 (U.S. petition for cert. filed Sept. 11, 2012). It
should be noted here that the scholarship in defense of marriage as a relationship between
one man and one woman explains that marriage does not exclude anyone in particular,
but simply establishes parameters for entry into the status and thus does not discriminate,
but equally applies the requirements to all who seek its entry. See Kohm, Homosexual
Union, supra note 38, at 58-59 (discussing that all individuals who seek to enter marriage
are subject to the same requirements).
113. See Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO), Change to Win (CTW), and National Education Association
(NEA) as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee at 6, Windsor v. United States, No.
90-567 (U.S. petition for cert. filed Sept. 11, 2012) (arguing that DOMA unfairly
excludes same-sex spouses and their families from receiving workplace benefits, whether
they are employed by the federal government or the private sector, specifically restricting
access to healthcare and other benefits for same-sex spouses); Brief for the Service and
Advocacy for Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Elders (SAGE), National Senior
Citizens Law Center (NSCLC) and American Society on Aging (ASA) as Amici Curiae
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee at 6, Windsor v. United States, No. 90-567 (U.S. petition
for cert. filed Sept. 11, 2012) (concerning the negative impact of DOMA on the financial
security of the growing population of elderly LGBT persons and their social security
benefits, retirement plan benefits, and tax benefits).
114. See Brief for the Partnership for New York City as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Plaintiff-Appellee at 6, Windsor v. United States, No. 90-567 (U.S. petition for cert. filed
Sept. 11, 2012) (arguing that marriage regulation should remain under state control so
that businesses are free to locate in states that have marriage policies they find desirable
and highlighting ways that DOMA burdens New York business); Brief for States of New
York, Vermont, and Connecticut as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee at 6,
Windsor v. United States, No. 90-567 (U.S. petition for cert. filed Sept. 11, 2012)
(arguing that, by adopting the view of marriage taken by some states and rejected by
others, DOMA discriminates among states, undermining federalism, and maintaining that
DOMA should be subject to heightened scrutiny).
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argued for local authority in marriage law. 115 Yet another brief drew
attention to the uniqueness of DOMA in denying recognition to a subset
of state-recognized marriages. Traditionally, the power to confer marital
status has been reserved to the states and, therefore, states have
developed diverse criteria for determining whether a couple will receive
marital status. 116 DOMA's denial of certain state-recognized marriages
effectively limits the states in an area where they previously had
autonomy. One brief argued for the fitness of homosexuality for
marriage and family life,117 while another brief filed by diverse cultural
and religious organizations118 expressed concern over a threat to religious
liberty posed by the incorporation into civil law of a single religious view
of marriage.' 19 Each of these briefs in support of Windsor made
arguments that conjugal marriage is too restrictive, unfair, and has no
legal basis in government regulation.
There were several amicus briefs submitted in defense of DOMA's
constitutionality. The first was the Frederick Douglass Foundation brief,
filed by an organization predominantly comprised of Black Americans,
which drew attention to distinctions between race and sexual orientation
115. Brief for The City of New York et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-
Appellee at 6, Windsor v. United States, No. 90-567 (U.S. petition for cert. filed Sept. 11,
2012) (describing how DOMA undercuts the efforts New York City has made to provide
equal treatment to same-sex and opposite-sex couples and how it forces the City to act as
an agent of discrimination, particularly with regard to City employees in state-recognized
same-sex marriages).
116. Brief for the Family Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-
Appellee, Windsor v. United States, No. 90-567 (U.S. petition for cert. filed Sept. 11,
2012) (representing a select group of family law professors, rather than all family law
professors everywhere).
117. See Brief for the American Psychological Association (APA), The American
Academy of Pediatrics, The American Psychiatric Association (APA), the American
Psychoanalytic Association, The National Association of Social Workers and its New
York City and State Chapters, and the New York State Psychological Association as
Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee at 6, Windsor v. United States, No. 90-567
(U.S. petition for cert. filed Sept. 11, 2012) (citing research indicating that homosexuality
is generally not chosen and that homosexual relationships are essentially equivalent to
heterosexual relationships).
118. See Brief for Religious Affiliates as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-
Appellee, Windsor v. United States, No. 90-567 (U.S. petition for cert. filed Sept. 11,
2012). Those various religious organizations named in the brief were the Anti-
Defamation League, Central Conference of American Rabbis, Congregation Beit Simchat
Torah, Bend the Arc: A Jewish Partnership for Justice, Hadassah, the women's Zionist
Organization of America, the Hindu American Foundation, the Interfaith Alliance
Foundation, Japanese American Citizens League, the Justice and Witness Ministries,
United Church of Christ, National Council of Jewish Women, People for the American
Way Foundation, Union for Reform Judaism, Women's League for Conservative
Judaism, and Women of Reform Judaism. Id.
119. Id. at 2-3.
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that bear on the equal protection analysis of DOMA. 120  A brief
submitted jointly by 14 states argued that any federal judicial decision on
marriage policies violates principles of federalism by forcing a particular
view of marriage upon all states.1 21  These states argued further that
encouraging a link between marriage and parenting is a legitimate state
interest and that any rationale extending benefits to same-sex unions
would also extend to platonic, polyamorous, and other relationships.
22
A brief by a former U.S. Attorney General, filed by the American Center
for Law and Justice, focused on the troubling nature of the government's
failure to defend the law of the United States.
23
The brief offered by the National Organization for Marriage argued
that DOMA is a legitimate (and necessary) exercise of federal power
124
and that Windsor overlooks legitimate state interests in marriage.
25
Another brief argued that the rational basis test is appropriate and that the
political powerlessness described in Windsor is missing, as same-sex
couples do not lack political power. 26 Finally, the American College of
120. Brief for the Frederick Douglass Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant at 6, Windsor v. United States, No. 90-567 (U.S. petition
for cert. filed Sept. 11, 2012) (arguing that, unlike race, sexual orientation is not
immutable, first, because rather than being an accident of birth, it is the product of
combined biological, sociological, and environmental factors, and second, because rather
than being objectively determinable, at least three definitions, which identify at least
three different sets of people, are commonly used to define sexual orientation).
121. Brief for States of Indiana, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho,
Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota and Virginia as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant at 6, Windsor v. United States, No. 90-
567 (U.S. petition for cert. filed Sept. 11, 2012) (arguing that, because state laws on
marriage are nationally in flux and there is no clear constitutional mandate, the High
Court should leave the decision to the political process rather than violating principles of
federalism by forcing a particular view upon any state). It is worth noting that DOMA
does not force one view of marriage on any state, but rather allows each state to
recognize marriage as it deems appropriate, and allows each state to recognize marriages
of other states or not based on each state's strong public policy.
122. Id. at4.
123. Brief for Former Attorneys General Edwin Meese and John Ashcroft as Amici
Curiae Supporting Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant at 6, Windsor v. United States, No.
90-567 (U.S. petition for cert. filed Sept. 11, 2012) (offering that, while the government
submitted a brief backing Windsor, the attorneys general discussed the negative impact
upon the judicial process and the importance of the separation of powers set forth in the
Constitution).
124. Brief for National Organization for Marriage as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant at 6, Windsor v. United States, No. 90-567 (U.S. petition
for cert. filed Sept. 11, 2012) (demonstrating that Congress has historically, with
Supreme Court approval, defined terms related to domestic relations law, including
marriage, while arguing that Congress has a duty to define marriage for federal statutes
and that the lower court's reasoning threatens existent state-federal relations).
125. Id. at 18.
126. Brief for The Concerned Women for America as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant at 6, Windsor v. United States, No. 90-567 (U.S. petition
1242 [Vol. 117:4
WHY MARRIAGE IS STILL THE BEST DEFAULT
Pediatricians-a group of some 100 dissenting physicians-filed a brief
in favor of DOMA, parting with the position of the American
Psychological Association, stating that the lower court was "mistaken to
so cavalierly discount the child-related interests served by marriage that
amply justify the definition of marriage retained by DOMA for purposes
of federal law."
' 127
Each of these briefs in support of DOMA made arguments that
marriage regulation has a legal basis in legitimate government interests
that greatly affect the state and the welfare of its citizens. The sheer
number of amicus briefs submitted in Windsor provides evidence that
marriage and its federal benefits are worth a fight. These briefs have
done the job of making the argument for marriage or marriage expansion,
revealing that this litigation is more about the nature and definition of
marriage than the tax problem Windsor faces. Whatever the outcome,
Windsor essentially proves that marriage is a critical aspect of default
estate planning.
C. Cohabitation: Marriage, Estate Planning, and the Cohabitation
Paradox
Marriage protects married individuals upon the death of a spouse. 128
Many individuals, however, cohabit rather than marry, or cohabit simply
to delay marriage."'
While deferring marriage, many young adults may choose to cohabit
with a partner. Cohabitation has increasingly become the first
coresidential union formed among young adults in the United States.
Among women, 68 percent of unions formed in 1997-2001 began as
a cohabitation rather than as a marriage. If entry into any type of
for cert. filed Sept. 11, 2012) (focusing on one factor used to determine whether a class is
suspect or quasi and thus subject to heightened scrutiny-whether the class is politically
powerless). This brief cites prominent officials' support of same-sex marriage, gay
contributors' impact on presidential campaigns, the Democratic Party's inclusion of the
repeal of DOMA in their party platform, and public opinion's shift toward favoring same-
sex marriage as evidence that gays and lesbians across the country, and particularly in
New York, are not politically powerless. Id.
127. Brief for the American College of Pediatricians as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant at 6, Windsor v. United States, No. 90-567 (U.S. petition
for cert. filed Sept. 11, 2012) (offering "important evidence suggesting that children
derive substantial benefits from the unique contributions of both men and women,
mothers and fathers, as opposed to just any two adults").
128. See supra notes 16-37 and accompanying text (on estate distribution benefits of
marriage).
129. America's Families and Living Arrangements: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://l.usa.gov/e05NXo (last visited Mar. 20, 2013). In 2010, unmarried households
comprised 45% of all U.S. households, with 99.6 million unmarried individuals over age
18, representing nearly 44% of the adult population. Id.
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union, marriage or cohabitation, is taken into account, then the timing
of a first union occurs at roughly the same point in the life course as
marriage did in the past. 130
Legal benefits have been a target for legislation. "Cohabitation has
been regulated to such an extent that, in many statutory circumstances, it
looks much like marriage., 13' Domestic partnership legislation has been
a large part of that regulation to confer legal rights on cohabitants,1 32 but
there is no federalization of this area of law:
133
The result of all this activity is a rather confusing legal situation, in
which cohabitants rights are based upon a mixture of remedies that
not only vary from state to state, but also result in intrastate legal
regimes based on different legal theories and offering a patchwork of
remedies from a variety of sources.1
34
Rights in cohabitation, however, are not the default option in
American law.135 In fact, the traditional position is that cohabitants have
no rights by virtue of their relationship. 136  If rights do arise between
cohabitants, they do so by judicial fiat based on quantum meruit
providing equitable remedies, not based on statutory marriage-like
130. CASEY E. COPEN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT'L HEALTH
STATATICS REP. No. 49, FIRST MARRIAGES IN THE UNITED STATES: DATA FROM THE 2006-
2010 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH (2012), available at
http://l.usa.gov/GMzSjd.
131. Lynne Marie Kohm & Karen M. Groen, Cohabitation and the Future of
Marriage, 17 REGENT U.L. REV. 261, 272 (2005) (discussing the paradox of cohabitation
as sabotaging the American dream of most adults for a happy marriage). "The trend in
family law and scholarship in Europe and Canada is to treat married and cohabiting
couples similarly, or even identically." Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Marry Me
Bill: Should Cohabitation Be the (Legal) Default Option?, 64 LA. L. REV. 403, 403
(2004).
132. A very small number of states that afford default spousal rights to domestic
partners, opposite sex couples, and same-sex couples include spousal rights in a
decedent's estate. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/20 (2011), available at
http://bit.ly/ 1EKWHL. Many of these types of statutes are limited to same-sex partners.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 201, 212(a), 212(d) (2011). For more
comprehensive information on state spousal rights for domestic partners, see Civil Unions
and Domestic Partnership Statutes, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (last updated
Mar. 21, 2013), http:/Ibit.ly/xWUlsj.
133. For a review of this regulation, see Kohm & Groen, supra note 131, at 266-68
(discussing case law and statutory schemes for cohabitation rights).
134. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Legal Treatment of Cohabitation in the United States,
26 LAW & POL'Y 119, 146 (2004).
135. See generally Brinig & Nock, supra note 131. "An additional result is that
same-sex couples are better protected in many areas than are heterosexual cohabitants.
The system as it now exists is clearly unstable." Bowman, supra note 134, at 146.
136. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979). This longstanding Illinois case
refused to recognize the marriage-like relationship of a man and a woman over a 15-year
period yielding 3 children for any financial or equitable remedies. Id.
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remedies. 137  Neither position grants rights in death to a surviving
cohabitant.
Although people who are young rarely consider estate planning,
death can happen at any age. Death can certainly happen during
cohabitation, where little if any benefits are afforded to surviving
partners. For those who wish to leave an inheritance to a partner, and
apparently that is a desire of many cohabiting partners, 3 8 unless they do
so testamentarily (by will), or by will substitute, 39 default estate
distribution rules will be completely unhelpful in those objectives.
40
137. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). This longstanding California case
initially granted palimonial rights to a cohabitant despite the lack of a written agreement
between the parties to do so. Id.
138. An empirical study published in 1998 concluded that a considerable majority of
cohabiting partners wanted their surviving partner to share in their estate upon their
death. See Mary L. Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical
Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. 1 (1998) (surveying both opposite sex couples and same-sex
couples).
139. Will substitutes include trusts, assets left upon death to a named beneficiary, and
jointly held assets, among others. For a discussion of both probate and non-probate
assets, see LYNNE MARIE KOHM & MARK L. JAMES, ESTATE PLANNING SUCCESS FOR
WOMEN: 9 SIMPLE STEPS TO PLAN YOUR ESTATE WITH FORESIGHT, CLARITY AND
THOUGHTFULNESS FOR THE BENEFIT OF THOSE YOU LOVE 24-32 (2006).
140. The question of whether "significant others" shall have inheritance rights is
posed by ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 43, but never answered. DUKEMINIER ET
AL., supra note 14, outlines the efforts to gain default death protections for a committed
partner:
In 1995 Professor [Lawrence W.] Waggoner proposed an amendment to the
UPC-to become UPC § 2-102B-that would have provided an intestate share
for "committed partners." A committed partner was defined as a person
"sharing a common household with the decedent in a marriage-like
relationship." Although Waggoner's proposal was never adopted by the
Uniform Law Commissioners, it was never rejected either. In 2002 the Joint
Editorial Board for Uniform Trusts and Estates Acts revisited Waggoner's
proposal, appoints Professor [Thomas] Gallanis as special reporter for the
project and tasking him with the preparation of a study on, and a model statue
for, inheritance rights of domestic partners. The JEB then abandoned the
project in 2004, but it consented to Gallanis publishing his study and model
statute. Under the Gallanis proposal, both same-sex and opposite-sex domestic
partners would be entitled to spousal rights to inheritance and elective share.
Whether the Gallanis proposal will influence the ongoing debate in the state
legislatures, and whether the Uniform Law Commission will ever take an
official position on this issue remains to be seen.
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 14, at 66. Other legal scholars have suggested remedies
for cohabitants. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital
Cohabitation: Rights and Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1265 (2001) (describing the need for benefits for state welfare
cohabitants); M. 0. Mhango, What Should the Board of Management of a Pension Fund
Consider when Dealing with Death Claims Involving Surviving Cohabitants?, 15(2)
POTCHEFSTROOM ELEC. L.J. 183 (2010), available at http://bit.ly/13rKLnX (arguing for a
government death benefit for South African cohabitants).
2013] 1245
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Thus, those who do not choose marriage are generally eliminated from
the benefits of estate planning default. 
141
Without marriage, those who live together until death do not receive
these automatic estate-planning benefits and are left vulnerable to a great
deal of problems. A cohabiting partner can be evicted from his or her
home in the event of the death of a partner, 142 is prohibited from the basic
family allowances as unrelated, 143 and is barred from any employment,
retirement, military, or intestate benefits allowed to a marriage partner or
family member,' 44 including health care benefits.145 If a decedent partner
claimed homestead benefits, the surviving partner may not enjoy those
benefits thereafter. 146 Even the household furniture and personal items
that the cohabitants shared cannot be passed to the surviving partner
under personal property set-aside laws; they can be passed only to a
surviving spouse:1
47
Marriage brings a number of legal and economic consequences,
mostly beneficial, to a surviving spouse. A married partner is entitled
to social security benefits based on the other partner's earnings, to
pension rights from the other partner's job, to an elective share of the
other partner's estate, and to the federal estate tax marital deduction
(eliminating all estate taxes on property one marriage partner
141. See, e.g., In re Estate of Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798 (1993) (holding that a
survivor of a homosexual partnership could not be considered a "surviving spouse" under
New York's law for spousal election, N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1
(McKinney 2013)).
142. In New York, however, a same-sex cohabiting partner was considered a "family
member," prohibiting his eviction from their home upon the death of his partner, the legal
tenant. See Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 212 (1989).
143. A family allowance generally is authorized by statute to award a surviving
spouse and dependent children maintenance and support for a fixed period at the death of
a decedent. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 14, at 422.
144. The federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
governs the role of pension accounts, retirement accounts, etc., and is designed to provide
survivorship rights to the spouse of an employee; it provides nothing to a cohabitating
partner. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000 & Supp. 2004). For a comprehensive look at
these benefits, see JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW 577-87 (3d ed. 2000); see also Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Federal Common
Law of ERISA, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 541 (1998) (providing an overview of the
foundation for the law).
145. See Jeffrey A. Brauch, Health Care Providers Meet ERISA: Are Provider
Claimsfor Misrepresentation of Coverage Preempted?, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 497 (1993).
146. Generally, this is true, unless provided otherwise by particular state statute. For
an overview of how the homestead laws work, see DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 14, at
421-22.
147. Certain tangible personal property of the decedent-generally up to $10,000-is
exempt from creditors' claims. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-403 (amended 2010),
8 U.L.A. 134 (1969).
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transferred to the other at death). Unmarried surviving partners have
none of these benefits. 148
Cohabitation regulation at common law has generally included the
doctrine of common law marriage, 14 9 which, at one point, increased the
number of couples considered legally married who were living together
unmarried.1 50 Common law marriage, however, is recognized by only a
few jurisdictions.15 1 Consequently, unless cohabitants meet the common
law requirements and reside in one of these jurisdictions, they do not
receive spousal rights by default.
152
The paradox of cohabitation is that individuals generally desire a
happy marriage but are unwilling to make the commitment that objective
requires, which causes them to opt for cohabitation and thereby lose all
of the benefits that the marital commitment affords. 153  "Marriage is
preferred over cohabitants' rights, but people cohabit because they fear
11154failure of a marriage, or they fear the work that marriage requires.
Furthermore, most people who choose cohabitation over marriage do not
understand the consequences of that decision. 155  Enjoyment of the
default benefits that marriage affords to a surviving spouse is usually
completely lost in cohabitation. Marriage, once again, is still the best
default option for protecting vulnerable parties in estate conflicts.
III. SOLUTIONS TO POTENTIAL CONFLICTS TOWARD PROTECTING
VULNERABLE PARTIES
Although marriage is clearly the best default for estate planning
conflicts, some alternative solutions are available for each of the
148. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 14, at 437.
149. The elements of common law marriage include that a man and a woman agree to
cohabit exclusive of all others and hold themselves out as married. See HOMER H.
CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 48, 50 (2d ed.
1988). However, the formal requirements of license and solemnization of marriage are
not required, yet the cohabitating couples are allowed to be treated as married for all state
and federal purposes. Id.
150. HARRY D. KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 220
(4th ed. 1998).
151. See Common-Law Marriage, NAT'L CONT. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (last updated
Apr. 19, 2011), http:/ibit.ly/102A5WO.
152. The only exception to this general rule appears to be New Hampshire, which
recognizes common law marriages as effective at death only, largely to protect
cohabiters. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (2013).
153. See Kohm & Groen, supra note 131, at 271-72.
154. Id. at 272.
155. DAVID POPENOE & BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, SHOULD WE LIVE TOGETHER?
WHAT YOUNG ADULTS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT COHABITATION BEFORE MARRIAGE: A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF RECENT RESEARCH (2d ed. 2002).
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aforementioned cases set forth in this article, which deserve a brief
review.
A. Alternatives for the Witherspoon Example
Family-wealth-transfer strategies may be helpful to a spouse
suffering from dementia or any loss of mental capacity, such as that
evident in the John Witherspoon circumstance. Generally, generational
wealth transfer strategies are designed to preserve family wealth looking
ahead to future generations,1 56 but those same strategies can be useful in
protecting a vulnerable and aging spouse. Research suggests that the
odds of sustaining wealth across generations are as low as 30 percent.
157
That wealth cannot be passed to forthcoming generations if the current
generation loses capacity to understand how to best transfer it, as
illustrated in Witherspoon. Furthermore, though Mr. Witherspoon was a
doctor who likely earned a relatively high income, most of his current
wealth has likely come from his daughter's success.
158
Generational estate planning strategies are significantly helpful in
dealing with pop culture' 59 and should be able to work in the reverse,
protecting children's assets from parental abuse. Importantly, heirs
frequently are not equipped to know how to protect their own money or
their own emotions. 60 Successful transition of family wealth can benefit
from preparation or training of heirs who gain that wealth.' 6 ' Many
resources exist to assist in that preparation;' 62 sharing and transferring the
156. See, e.g., RON BLUE, SPLITTING HEIRS: GIVING YOUR MONEY AND THINGS TO
YOUR CHILDREN WITHOUT RUINING THEIR LIVES (2004) (discussing how to positively
impact the future generations of a family with sound and charitable estate planning
principles).
157. See ROY WILLIAMS & VIC PREISSER, PREPARING HEIRS: FIVE STEPS TO A
SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION OF FAMILY WEALTH AND VALUES 17 (2003).
158. His daughter is worth $80 million. Reese Witherspoon Net Worth, CELEBRITY
NET WORTH, http://bit.ly/15NiKmp (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
159. See Lynne Marie Kohm, The Latest Twist on the Rich Girl Dilemma: My Partner
Wants My Money and My Child, 3 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 199, 205-06
(2011) (discussing decision-making in generational estate planning in the context of the
Johnson Dynasty estate and the now deceased so-called "Band-Aid Princess" heiress,
Casey Johnson).
160. See Love and Money Are Two Separate Things, WEALTH LEGACY GRP.,
http://bit.ly/ZnXml (last visited Mar. 25, 2013); Relationships, WEALTH LEGACY GRP.,
http://bit.ly/ZnXxeP (last visited Mar. 25, 2013) (each discussing the emotional
entanglement in wealth transfer).
161. See generally JUDY MARTEL, THE DILEMMAS OF FAMILY WEALTH: INSIGHTS ON
SUCCESSION, COHESION, AND LEGACY (2006); WILLIAMS & PREISSER, supra note 157.
162. See generally CHARLES W. COLLIER, WEALTH IN FAMILIES (2007); JOLINE
GODFREY, RAISING FINANCIALLY FIT KIDS (2003); JAMES E. HUGHES, JR., FAMILY: THE
COMPACT AMONG GENERATIONS (2007); JAMES E. HUGHES, JR., FAMILY WEALTH-
KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY: How FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR ADVISERS PRESERVE
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same family values is largely the key to any successful strategy. 163 In
this situation, Witherspoon's daughter, Reese, may be the family member
who must communicate her values to her parents, specifically, the value
of marriage. When families agree together on their values, future family
members are more likely to uphold them.' 64 Taking the opportunity to
talk about values may even ferret out mental health issues that implicate
capacity concerns, such as those that John Witherspoon exhibited.
Another solution includes pursuing a conservatorship over an
incapacitated family member, as the Witherspoons are doing under these
circumstances.' 65 When an adult is impaired to such a significant extent
that he or she is unable to manage financial resources or meet essential
requirements for physical health and safety, state laws generally provide
for protection of the incapacitated individual. 166  A court-appointed
guardian or conservatorship can be a solution to protect an incapacitated
person in need of assistance, and it provides court oversight of the agents
that care for the incapacitated individual. 167  Guardianship may be an
expensive solution, however, due to the costs associated with
litigation, 168 but there are other remedies available to the average
individual to avoid estate-planning conflicts.
A simple power of attorney can be a better and more flexible
management tool in the event of incapacity. A power of attorney can be
general or limited and can be easily prepared if the principal has some
limited capacity to understand that he or she is appointing an agent.169 A
trust may provide similar management protection from creditors, 170 and
HUMAN, INTELLECTUAL, AND FINANCIAL ASSETS FOR GENERATIONS (2004); RoY
WILLIAMS & VIC PREISSER, PHILANTHROPY, HEIRS, & VALUES: How SUCCESSFUL
FAMILIES ARE USING PHILANTHROPY TO PREPARE THEIR HEIRS FOR POST-TRANSITION
RESPONSIBILITIES (2005); THAYER CHEATHAM WILLIS, NAVIGATING THE DARK SIDE OF
WEALTH: A LIFE GUIDE FOR INHERITORS (2008).
163. 5 Ways to Prepare Your Heir to Inherit Your Estate, INVESTORGUIDE.COM (Aug.
23, 2010), http://bit.ly/WSavVi.
164. Id.
165. See Gang, supra note 52.
166. KOHM & JAMES, supra note 139, at 40. However, "the mere presence of poor
judgment, mental illness or a physical disability does not render one an incapacitated
person." Id.
167. For a comprehensive discussion of guardianship, see ANDERSON ET AL., supra
note 10, at 20-21. Guardianship can be plenary, covering comprehensive and complete
care for the affairs of the incapacitated, or it can be limited and specific. See KOHM &
JAMES, supra note 139, at 42.
168. KOHM & JAMES, supra note 139, at 41 ("The expense, publicity and delay caused
by the guardianship hearings, court deliberations and issuance of a court order can all be
avoided by proper planning.").
169. See id. at 41-46 (discussing the principal-agency concept, how to prepare a
power of attorney, the types of powers, how to use the power of attorney after it is
executed, and the essential benefits of the power of attorney).
170. Id. at 46, 102-03.
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even spendthrift protection from the beneficiary himself.17' A trust is a
useful tool for management concerns because it provides "a continuum
of control by clearly stating what happens to your assets no matter what
happens to you.'
172
These solutions reveal that estate planning provides numerous
alternatives for dealing with the conflicts that result from incapacity.
Marriage, however, is the best default estate-planning tool because it
protects assets from interloping third parties. The next section shows
that tax strategies can also offer solutions to conflicts in estate planning
when marriage is impossible.
B. Alternatives for the Windsor Example
The litigation in Windsor arose because the best default for estate-
planning marriage was not possible for federal estate tax purposes.
Intentional estate planning, and some specific and significant strategies,
therefore, would have been the best avenue for Windsor and Spyer.
These strategies are deserving of explanations that are missed, or not
considered, by most commentators of the case.
Windsor seeks a judicial ruling affirming her marital deduction on
Spyer's estate; yet, even if she wins the deduction judicially, her estate
will pay estate taxes upon her death. 173  Estate tax on Windsor's
remaining estate will be paid out of her estate at her death because estate
taxes are paid by the estate on the death of the surviving spouse. 174 The
marital deduction "allows each spouse to give unlimited amounts of
property to the other without incurring transfer taxes, so long as the
property will be exposed to tax if and when it leaves the marital unit."'
175
In sum, the marital deduction simply delays the estate tax until the death
of the surviving spouse, unless spouses plan ahead.
As same-sex spouses seeking legal tax and estate planning advice,
Spyer and Windsor should have consulted an estate-planning attorney
that would have predicted their tax problem. The problem was not only
that the marital deduction would be impossible for them to enjoy under
federal law. Rather, the problem was also that, without proper planning,
even if same-sex marriage qualified for the deduction, the tax deferred by
the marital deduction is recaptured in any event after the death of the last
171. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 311-23 (discussing the concept and
jurisprudence surrounding the concept of the spendthrift trust).
172. KOHM & JAMES, supra note 139, at 100.
173. See ANDERSON ETAL., supra note 10, at 28.
174. See I.R.C. §§ 2035-42 (2006) (discussing the recapture of the marital deduction
from the gross estate of the surviving spouse at his or her death).
175. Id.
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survivor. 7 6 This second problem is what most married couples plan to
avoid. A prudent estate-planning attorney could have helped Windsor
and Spyer avoid this problem (while also averting the ensuing litigation)
by using a credit shelter trust or bypass trust. This unified credit'77
allows couples to avoid paying the estate tax upon the death of the
surviving spouse.'78 Spyer and Windsor could have planned their estates
using a credit shelter trust to preserve their lifetime exclusion amounts
allowable by federal tax law to every individual U.S. citizen.'79 "With
proper estate planning, a same-sex couple can utilize bypass trusts to
avoid a second estate tax at the death of the second partner."' 180 Using
the unified credit maximally is the thrust of this concept.
The solution, from a tax perspective, is to give less to the surviving
spouse and more to a separate trust that will be able to use the unified
credit in the first estate. A "credit shelter trust" can work differently in a
variety of situations, but the basic idea is to create an entity that does not
use the marital deduction.
18
8
In 2009, when Spyer passed away, the federal lifetime exclusion
was $3,500,000 for every individual. 182  Securing that exclusion in a
credit shelter trust for each spouse would have allowed both Spyer and
Windsor together to pass seven million dollars free of estate tax to their
heirs.
Spyer could have also utilized the annual gift tax to make the most
of her lifetime exclusion.'"3 Making lifetime gifts each year would have
allowed her to transfer a significant amount of her estate to Windsor free
176. Proper planning could include a number of ways to maximize the unlimited
marital deduction. KOHM & JAMES, supra note 139, at 173-77.
177. I.R.C. § 2505 (2006 & Supp. 2011); I.R.C. § 2056 (2006); INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., PUB. 950, INTRODUCTION TO ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES (2011), available at
http://I .usa.gov/4NrOeE (describing the unified credit shelter tax rule).
178. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 30-32 (explaining the concept).
179. See, e.g., KOHM & JAMES, supra note 139, at 177-84 (describing how to establish
and operate such a trust, as well as how to calculate it and how to fund it).
180. Patricia A. Cain, Planning for Same-Sex Couples in 2012: Tax and Estate
Planning for Same-Sex Couples: Overview and Detailed Analysis, A.L..-A.B.A.
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 1, 8 (Oct. 2012). This article offers an excellent overview of
the law in this area, as well as of estate planning techniques. Griffin provides additional
techniques on estate and gift tax planning strategies for same-sex couples and suggests
that, "[w]hile in most cases, same-sex couples are disadvantaged by the lack of legal
recognition of their relationships, that non-recognition can afford tax planning
opportunities." Griffin, supra note 95, at 41 (discussing how to effectively use Chapter
14 of the Internal Revenue Code).
181. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 30-31.
182. See KOHM & JAMES, supra note 139, at 164 (offering a chart on lifetime
exclusion amounts for easy reference).
183. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2006); see also ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 25-26
(providing a background and brief history of the gift tax).
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of tax. 184 This couple might have used additional strategies, such as the
concept of a family limited partnership (FLP),'85 which would have
established a business entity to separate ownership interests in
partnership assets for family members. 86 The tax benefits would have
been significant for Spyer's estate if she and Windsor had used a strategy
utilizing an FLP, as "the value of those interests are discounted for estate
tax purposes.' 87
A combination of the aforementioned strategies would have been
astutely wise and financially beneficial for Windsor and Spyer to have
implemented. Utilizing a combination of these strategies, Windsor and
Spyer would likely have avoided their marriage non-recognition problem
and their tax problem. The next section offers solutions for those who
choose cohabitation.
C. Alternatives for Cohabitation
Although cohabitating partners could benefit by utilizing the
strategies suggested above for Spyer and Windsor, cohabitating partners
could also utilize private arrangements. For example, naming a
cohabiting partner as a beneficiary whenever possible-such as on
employment agreements, bank accounts, and other death benefits-as
184. See KOHM & JAMES, supra note 139, at 184-85 (explaining how this strategy
works to reduce estate tax with gifts to adults). Because it is difficult to anticipate which
partner will predecease the other, most couples use this strategy to balance their
respective estates to maximize estate tax avoidance.
185. A family limited partnership first arose in Turner v. Commissioner, 382 F.3d
367, 369 (3d Cir. 2004), where the court held that a family limited partnership ("FLP")
was a lifetime transfer that was testamentary in nature that bypassed estate tax. Id. at
377; see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 14, at 886 (providing a more complete
description of Turner). The essence of the FLP is that, as an estate-planning vehicle, it is
a non-probate transfer involving a partnership interest that is driven by tax
considerations. Dukeminier et al. explain:
In an FLP, the decedent transfers assets (usually the majority of his assets) to
the partnership in exchange for a limited partnership interest. The decedent's
family likewise transfers assets (usually minimal assets, however) to the
partnership in exchange for limited partnership interests. The general partner is
a corporation owned by the decedent and his family. The reason for creating an
FLP is that, when the decedent's limited partnership interests pass to his family,
the value of those interests are discounted for estate tax purposes because of
their lack of control rights and nonmarketability.
Id. at 330.
186. See KOHM & JAMES, supra note 139, at 190-93 (setting forth not only how to
establish an FLP but also the benefits of an FLP and who should consider using one).
187. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 14, at 886.
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well as holding assets jointly, is an excellent way to provide partner
protection in the event of death. 8'
In addition, contractual remedies between the cohabiting parties
could assist in limiting the detriments they will face at death by not being
married.18 9 Although the traditional position is that cohabitants have no
rights by code,' 90 and some by quantum meruit,' 91 couples can make
written contracts that could protect each other at death. For example, a
written lease signed by both cohabitants would protect the survivor from
eviction upon the death of a partner. 92 A trust agreement is a non-
probate form of a written contract that could be utilized by cohabiting
partners to carry out their wishes.
193
A will is a useful estate-planning tool for cohabitants, as each
cohabiting partner may name the other as an heir outright.
194
Furthermore, to protect from loss of shared personal property, each
partner could also utilize a separate writing to distribute upon death
certain specified tangible personal property for the benefit of the
surviving partner. 1
95
188. See KOHM & JAMES, supra note 139, at 24-32 (reviewing how assets can be held
jointly, or left to named beneficiaries, all as will substitutes).
189. See Bowman, supra note 134, at 126-29 (describing the law of contracts between
cohabitants).
190. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ill. 1979). Perhaps Hewitt is a reason
why Illinois adopted a domestic partner code, the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection
and Civil Union Act. 2010 Ill. Legis. Serv. 96-1513 (West). The Act allows same-sex
and opposite-sex couples to enter into civil unions, giving them some of the same
benefits available to married couples, including the right to visit a sick partner in the
hospital, disposition of a deceased loved one's remains, and the right to make decisions
about a loved one's medical care (but offering no estate planning protection). Id.
191. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976).
192. Some landlords may still resist leasing a property to unmarried tenants. See
generally Erin P. B. Zasada, Civil Rights-Rights Protected and Discrimination
Prohibited: Living in Sin in North Dakota? Not Under My Lease, 78 N.D. L. REV. 539
(2002); Michael V. Hernandez, The Right of Religious Landlords to Exclude Unmarried
Cohabitants: Debunking the Myth of the Tenant's "New Clothes," 77 NEB. L. REV. 494
(1998).
193. KOHM & JAMES, supra note 139, at 82-101 (offering an overview of how and
why to establish, implement, and benefit from using a trust).
194. See id. at 32, 72-81 (explaining the primary benefits of a will).
195. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-400 (2012). This writing would also be
referenced in each partner's will with language such as:
I have herewith created simultaneously with this, my last will and testament, a
separate writing to name beneficiaries for specific items of personal property as
I so choose. That writing I hereby incorporate into this, my last will and
testament, by this reference, and it shall have the full force and effect of this,
my last will and testament, accordingly.
The list would include specific items of personal property naming the cohabitant as the
beneficiary.
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The greatest problem that implementing these strategies and
solutions will encounter, however, is the attitude of the cohabitants
themselves: they generally do not plan for an ending of the relationship,
by death or otherwise.
A much more profound problem with the use of contract principles to
redress inequities that may arise on termination of a cohabiting
relationship is that cohabiting couples-like married couples-
typically do not make contracts; they simply proceed trusting that
their relationship will endure and that each party will treat the other
fairly.... Most cohabitants simply proceed under vague agreements
to pool resources and make no provision for remedies upon
termination. 
196
Though cohabitating couples may proceed in the relationship as if
they are married, they are not married and will not receive the default
benefits married couples enjoy. Therefore, they must plan ahead, even
when married couples have the luxury of relying on the default. These
facts prove once again that marriage is still the best default for estate
planning conflicts.
CONCLUSION
This article has explored the potential problems in estate planning
and distribution when parties enter into marriage-like relationships that
are unprotected by law. When a conflict challenges a testator's
testamentary capacity, as in the bigamous case of Witherspoon, marriage
is the default that protects a partner from his own indiscretions. When a
conflict challenges estate taxes, as in the same-sex marriage challenge in
Windsor, marriage remains the best estate-planning default. And, when
estate-planning conflicts involve cohabiting partners, again those
instances reveal that marriage is honorable 97 and is still the best default
in estate planning conflicts. Marriage expansion in situations of same-
sex marriage and marriage-like cohabitation does not necessarily mimic
marriage, nor do those marriage-like relationships provide the benefits
196. Bowman, supra note 134, at 128. Professor Bowman cites to an empirical study
that revealed these attitudes in cohabitation relationships.
One empirical study of Minnesota residents who self-identified as being in a
committed unmarried relationship found that only 21 percent had written
agreements about property; of these, 52.1 percent had a provision for dividing
property if the relationship were to end, but only 35.4 percent set up duties of
support upon termination[.]
Id. (citations omitted).
197. "Let marriage be honored by all." Hebrews 13:4, LIGUORI PUBLICATIONS 1325
(New American Bible 2004). Marriage protects partners in the event of death by
providing considerate and honorable foresight to benefit the one you love.
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and protections often sought by those who enter into them. Such
relationships simply are not equivalent to marriage.
Marriage protects vulnerable parties as they age. Its benefits are
sought after by a small demographic of same-sex partners and yet are
ignored or dismissed as unnecessary by a large demographic of
vulnerable cohabiters who do not understand the legal jeopardy they live
in-or die in-without the protection of marriage. When individuals
enter into relationships unprotected by law, they risk enduring the legal
ramifications that those relationships can create. Vulnerable parties who
have entered into alternative relationships unprotected by law are
generally the first to find that marriage is still the best default to avoid
estate-planning conflicts.
What does a Tennessee bigamy case have to do with a New York
same-sex marriage? And what does either case have to do with the
growing cultural trend and large demographic of individuals who choose
cohabitation over marriage? This article has demonstrated that the
answer is hidden in a simple sentence: Marriage remains the best default
in estate planning conflicts.
2013] 1255

